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Board role performance in service organizations: the importance of human capital in the 
context of a developing country. 
 
 
Abstract 
Purpose –We draw from multiple theories of upper echelons, stakeholder, agency, resource-
based view and stewardship to establish the extent to which human capital (other than that of the 
board itself) in service organizations affect board role performance in those service sector firms. 
Design/methodology/approach –This study is cross-sectional and correlational. Analyses are 
conducted using SPSS and Analysis of Moment Structures (AMOS) software on a sample of 128 
service firms in Uganda.  
Findings – Findings reveal that dimensions of employee safety, entrepreneurial skills, 
entrepreneurial development, employee welfare and employee relations fit the model of human 
capital and predict up to 69.1% of the variance in board role performance. The results of this 
study reveal that board role performance is affected by prior decisions, for example to invest in 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) activities targeting employees that augment firm 
characteristics like existence of appropriate human capital. Essentially, an improvement in the 
quality of human capital explains positive variances in board role performance. 
Originality/value – This study is one of the few that partly account for endogeneity in the study 
of boards, a methodological concern previously cited in literature (see, Bascle, 2008; Hamilton & 
Nickerson, 2003). Empirical associations between board role performance and organisational 
performance would not be useful unless we are able to grasp the causal mechanisms that lie 
behind those empirical associations (Hambrick, 2007). Thus this study contributes to literature 
that tries to account for variances in board role performance and supports a multi-theoretical 
approach as a relevant framework in the study of human capital and board role performance. 
Result limitations/implications – Cross-sectional data do not allow for testing of the process 
aspect of the models; however, they provide evidence that the models can stand empirical tests. 
Additional research should examine the process aspects of human capital and board role 
performance. 
Practical implications – Most companies in developing nations have relied on normative 
guidelines in prescribing what boards need to enhance performance, probably explaining why 
some boards have not been successful in their role performance. This research confirms that 
appropriate human capital, which can be leveraged through CSR ideals of employee safety, 
recognition, welfare, training in entrepreneurship; consistent with the stakeholder theory, can 
facilitate the board in the performance of its roles. In the developing-country context, 
organizations’ boards could use these findings as a guideline, that is, what to focus on in the 
context of human capital development in organisations, because doing so improves their own 
role-performance 
Type of paper: Research paper 
Key Words: Human Capital, Board Role Performance, Service Firms, CSR, Developing 
Country, Uganda. 
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Introduction 
Understanding the nature of effective board role performance is among the most important areas 
in management research (Ong and Wan, 2008). This is because among factors affecting 
performance of firms is the performance of the board (Dermirbas and Yukhanaev, 2011). 
Shareholders increasingly expect boards of directors to exercise greater oversight over the social 
and environmental impacts of corporate activities. According to Barney (1991) and Wernerfelt 
(1984) corporate social responsibility (CSR) may help firms to develop new competences, 
resources and capabilities. Essentially, the performance of a board is partly rooted in this 
perspective because the board formulates and support policies consistent with this dimension. A 
board that develops the human capital dimension of intellectual capital is predicted to improve its 
performance. A number of CSR activities that help improve this human capital dimension have 
been documented. These include: allowing employees to volunteer expertise and collecting 
donations from employees (Ahmad, 2006); training activities, safeguarding employee health, 
support of sports activities and employee services (Perrini et al., 2006); following ethical norms, 
improving labour relations and providing employment (Ip, 2008).  
 The benefits that accrue from CSR activities targeting the human capital dimension have 
also been widely documented. For example, more satisfied and productive workforce (The 
Aspen Institute, 2003); competitive advantage in terms of ability to attract quality employees 
(Weiss, 2003); internal benefits through improved employee motivation, morale, commitment 
and loyalty to the company; reduced turnover, recruitment, and training costs; employees’ 
positive attitudes regarding workplace quality and competitive advantages due to employees’ 
positive workplace attitudes (Branco and Rodrigues, 2006). Such benefits imply that CSR ideals 
targeting human capital contribute to the long-term prosperity of companies and ultimately their 
survival (World Business Council for Sustainable Development, 2000). According to Branco and 
Rodrigues (2006) socially responsible employment practices including fair wages, clean and safe 
working environment, training opportunities, health and education benefits for workers and their 
families, provisions of childcare facilities, flexible work hours and job sharing, can bring direct 
benefits to a firm by increased morale and productivity while reducing absenteeism and staff 
turnover. This observation is consistent with Upham’s (2006) suggestion that being a socially 
responsible company can have a powerful positive effect on employees by increasing employee 
retention, boosting identification with the company, and raising helping behaviour. Top 
management team is responsible for managing the human capital consistent with upper echelons 
theory which Hambrick and Mason (1984) propounded. Moreover, a company’s management 
team must know that a modern company changes so rapidly that everything is dependent on its 
human capital (Kamukama et al., 2010). This implies that even boards’ performance of their 
roles is dependent on the human capital residing in people in organizations. To our knowledge 
empirical studies on the possible link between human capital creation, consistent with CSR 
ideals, and board role performance are non-existent. Instead, a number of studies highlight 
positive effects of the corporate investments in CSR activities on the creation or depletion of the 
intangible resources associated with employees (Denizde la Cruz and Perez de Saa, 2003; Branco 
and Rodrigues, 2006;Fuentes-Garcia et al. 2008; Surroca et al., 2010). 
Consistent with CSR proclivity to human capital, in this paper we provide evidence that 
if human capital in service firms is good or excellent; an improvement in board role performance 
ensues. We premise this on the fact that Guadamillas-Go´mez and Donate-Manzanares (2011), 
demonstrate that CSR can be of great advantage to an innovative firm if it adopts a stakeholder 
approach to corporate strategy and includes a positive ethical stance to team working. Moreover, 
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certain ethical requirements also exist in relation to dignity and human rights, work conditions or 
environmental respect (Werhane, 2008). Arguably, then, a board of directors that projects its 
commitment to stakeholder interests should develop a strategy that includes developing and 
exploiting their human capital for the very performance of its (board) roles. While Westphal 
(1999) indicates the existence of benefits of a collaborative relationship with management in 
terms of the provision by directors of advice and counselling, there could also be benefits to the 
board that accepts advice from human capital residing in employees and managers. Such a 
linkage can be detected empirically (Hambrick and Mason, 1984).Therefore, the overall 
objective of this paper is to establish the extent to which human capital in service organizations 
affect board role performance. 
 
Motivation and contribution of the paper 
Our study is motivated by four main reasons and makes contributions to existing board 
role performance, intellectual capital and CSR literature. First, empirical investigations into the 
possibility that properly harnessed human capital in accordance with CSR prescriptions explains 
positive variances in board performance of its roles are sparse. This is despite studies showing 
the importance of human capital if firms are to be responsive to the service needs of the market 
(Ting, et al., 2010) and managers endowed with a high level of human capital are likely to 
deliver consistent and high-quality services (Becker, 1964; Mincer, 1974). Extant studies mostly 
focus on measurement of human capital in firms (e.g., Robinson, 2009); advocate for break 
through board performance by harnessing boards’ intellectual capital (e.g., Nicholson and Kiel, 
2004) and propose intellectual capital reporting (e.g., Abeysekera, 2007).The reasons for 
previous studies’ focus on human capital is because of its crucial influence as a source of 
innovation; its important role in shaping competitive advantage (Sveiby, 1997; Stewart, 1997); 
its importance in organisational value creation (Fitz-enz, 2000; Bontis and Fitz-end,2002; 
Kamukama, et al., 2010) and employees representing a stakeholder group commonly identified 
as highly important to organisations (Clarkson, 1995). These reasons support the conjecture that 
without appropriate human capital, it could almost be impossible for the board to perform its 
roles, hence the motivation of the paper in investigating this possibility.  
Second, CSR is currently a topical issue in Uganda with some studies (e.g. Nkiko and 
Katamba, 2010) indicating that strategic CSR is relatively new. KPMG (2008) reported that CSR 
management in developing nations has become more challenging, especially given that there is 
no definitive consensus on what CSR means. In this paper we respond to the call by Katamba, et 
al. (2012) that more studies from a developing country perspective should be undertaken to 
assess the contribution and development impact of companies characterized by good CSR 
management. Moreover, Katamba, et al. (2012) found unbalanced engagement in CSR for 
business managers in Uganda. Ugandan managers are largely motivated towards CSR by 
external factors such as attracting and retaining customers to achieve competitive advantage, 
rather than internal factors such as CSR policies and employee (human) welfare. They also found 
that the responsibility to initiate, administer, and monitor CSR activities is largely vested in 
middle-level managers. Katamba, et al. (2012) concluded that such findings point to many 
challenges to CSR implementation amongst managers in Uganda. Earlier Nkiko and Katamba 
(2010) had indicated that, companies in Uganda can be internally supported to develop a broader 
and integrated CSR strategy and build internal capacity for CSR development and 
implementation. Thus, in addition, this study makes a case for policies by the board supporting 
investments in CSR dimensions that target human capital for board performance of its roles. 
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Third, poorly performing companies have often led to perceived attrition of credibility of 
board role performance. This, according to Ong and Wan (2008) is generally denoted as a 
board’s ability to perform its roles (Forbes and Milliken, 1999; Cornforth, 2001), identified by 
literature as monitoring; service; strategy and resource provision (Zahraand Pearce, 1989; 
Maassen, 1999; Daily et al., 2003; Abor andBiekpe, 2007). Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) have also 
isolated the board role of facilitating the acquisition of critical company resources (Davis and 
Cobb, 2010). Therefore if an outgoing board does not leave behind an appropriate human capital, 
the successor board can be expected to underperform its roles. This conjecture puts the board and 
organizational human capital residing in people in organizations other than the board itself at the 
centre of board role performance debate and suggests that we should focus on human capital’s 
proclivity to board role performance. The censure of board role performance system without 
analysing human capital as a precursor to board role performance is pedestrian. 
 Finally, the Ugandan services sector has since early 2000s gained a significant share of 
Uganda’s GDP growth and in 2009/2010 contributed 49 percent to GDP and to its growth by 13 
percent. It has remained the sector with the highest demonstrated potential than any other sector 
in Uganda (Nkundabanyanga et al., 2013). The importance of this sector creates much of the 
interest by the Ugandan government regarding board role performance of this sector and from a 
CSR perspective, is expected to leverage core factors of human capital development, innovation, 
knowledge, responsibility and ethics (Guadamillas-Go´mez, and Donate-Manzanares, 2011). 
Moreover, the services sector is often anecdotally taken to be human capital –laden. Government 
and other stakeholders need to gain reasonable assurance that the sector’s firms continue to 
register impressive performance. This study indicates that this potential can be harnessed through 
well-defined observed variables of board role performance bolstered by appropriate human 
capital in respective firms. 
 The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: The next section is theoretical background, 
then literature review and hypotheses development. This is followed by the research 
methodology. The penultimate section is the results section and discussion. The final section is 
the conclusions and implications. 
 
Theoretical background 
Literature explaining the conditions underlying human capital and board role 
performance might be dominated by three perspectives. First is agency theory and stewardship 
theory. Agency theory recognises the blemish of governance structures in protecting 
shareholders’ interests and is concerned with the consequences from the conflict of interests 
between managers and shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 
1983). Agency theory supposes that the interests of managers are not necessarily aligned with the 
interests of shareholders. The board of directors is considered to be an efficient mechanism for 
monitoring a firm’s managers on behalf of its investors. Accordingly, the roles of the board of 
directors are to maximize shareholders’ wealth, reduce agency costs, select or dismiss the CEO, 
evaluate the CEO and company performance, and also participate in the strategic decision 
process and control (Kamardin and Haron, (2011). While agency theorists see managers as self-
seeking, proponents of the competing stewardship theory argue that it is possible that managers’ 
interests are similar to those of shareholders (Davis et al., 1997). Stewardship theorists thus 
suggest a collaborative approach between directors and managers (Ong and Wan, 2008). Such an 
approach stresses service, calling for boards to advise the managers (Sundaramurthy and Lewis, 
2003) and vice versa. 
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Second, the strategic relevance of human capital to board role performance can also be 
studied within the context of resource-based view (RBV) of the firm. Resource-based view 
emphasises the strategic relevance of knowledge-based competences (Barney, 1991) and core 
competences should be developed internally (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990).Core competences are 
those that are valuable, rare, inimitable, and non-transferable (Wernerfelt, 1984). Moreover, the 
theoretical premise for integrating CSR and Intellectual Capital (IC) among whose dimensions is 
human capital, is the RBV (Surrocaet al., 2010; Passettiet al., 2009). The RBV identifies the 
determinants of firm performance in internal organizational resources (Barney, 1991; Seppanen, 
2009). With regard to the relationship between RBV and human capital, it must be underlined 
that, according to the RBV, only valuable, rare, imperfectly imitable and substitutable resources 
are able to generate sustainable competitive advantages. These features are typical of intangible 
resources (Lev, 2001; Galbreath, 2005; Reed et al., 2006). Galbreath and Galvin (2008) 
compares the effects of firm-specific resources and industry-specific factors on the performance 
variations and provide evidence that only intangible assets and capabilities are able to explain the 
company’s performance variations. RBV contributes in the understanding of the relationship 
between CSR and firm performance (Branco and Rodrigues, 2006). Russo and Fouts (1997) 
illustrate the potential of the RBV framework as an analytical tool for studying how CSR and 
corporate performance are interrelated through their mutual connection to a firm’s resources. 
Some of the studies focus on CSR activities to predict the creation and development of intangible 
resources (Orlitzky et al. 2003; Branco and Rodrigues, 2006). Thus, RBV suggests that variances 
in firm performance are primarily the result of resource heterogeneity across firms (Wernerfelt, 
1984). This implies that the different levels of human capital in different firms can explain 
differences in those firms’ performance and, better still, cause variances in board role 
performance.  
Third is stakeholder theory and upper echelons theories. Stakeholder theory is 
underpinned by the notion that stakeholders are important to organizational performance and 
require explicit consideration in corporate strategy formulation (Cuganesan, 2006).Contemporary 
understandings of stakeholder theory derive from the definition of a stakeholder as “any group or 
individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the firm’s objectives” (Freeman, 
1984, p. 25).Some of the studies focus on stakeholder management (Hillman and Keim, 2001) to 
predict the creation and development of intangible resources. Therefore the achievement of a 
service company’s objectives (proxied by board role performance) might be dependent on human 
capital in such a company. And the firm might be considered as a coalition in which the different 
stakeholders participate to gain their own benefit (Freeman, 1984).According to upper echelons 
theory propounded by Hambrick and Mason (1984): “Organisational outcomes – both strategies 
and effectiveness – are viewed as reflections of the values and cognitive bases of powerful actors 
in the organisation. It is expected that, to some extent such linkages can be detected empirically,” 
(Hambrick and Mason, 1984, p.193). Practically, the chief executive shares tasks and, to some 
extent, power with other team members (Hambrick and Mason, 1984). While Berle and Means 
(1932) indicate that owners have a greater stake in the firm than do non-owners, Hambrick and 
Mason (1984) indicate that such reasoning ignores the fact that non-owner executives derive 
their livelihood from the organisation and thus depend on its continuing health. This criticism of 
the agency model suggests that human capital (other than board human capital) residing in 
managers and employees is indeed relevant to board role performance. Accordingly, this study is 
underpinned primarily by stakeholder theory, resource-based view, resource dependency theory, 
agency theory and stewardship theory to provide a relevant framework for understanding board 
 6 
role performance and for its explanation. Assumptions of a more recent theory that there is a 
need for a multi-theory approach to the roles of boards (Neville, 2011) provide support for this 
multi-theoretic approach to this study. 
 
Literature review and hypotheses development 
Human capital 
Human capital includes, leadership, problem solving ability, work environment 
(interaction), recruitment and selection, career paths, rewards and recognition, employee 
satisfaction, employee retention, employee relations, knowledge (including tacit), functional 
skills and experience (Roos et al., 2005). However, it has also been conceptualized by 
Abeysekera (2007) as training and development, entrepreneurial skills, equity issues, employee 
safety, employee relations and employee welfare. According to Abeysekera (2007), training and 
development sub-category comprises know-how, vocational qualifications, career development 
and training programs and the equity issues sub-category consists of equity issues relating to 
race, gender, religion and disability. The employee relation sub-category comprises union 
activity, employees being thanked, employees being featured and employee involvement in the 
community whilst the employee welfare sub-category comprises employee and executive 
compensation plans, employee benefits, and employee share and option ownership plans 
(Abeysekera, 2007). According to Blaug (1976), the concept of human capital is the purchase of 
health care and education and the spending of time searching for a job with the highest possible 
rate of pay (welfare). All these phenomena - health, education, job search, information retrieval, 
migration, and in-service training are conjectured to be investment in human capital, whether 
undertaken by individuals on their own behalf or undertaken by society on behalf of its members 
(Blaug, 1976). Thus Becker (1964) argues that the basis of human capital theory lies in the 
concept that individuals possess knowledge, skills, or experiences, which have economic value 
to a firm.  
 
H1: A relationship exists between human capital factor structure of observed 
variables and the underlying latent variables of employee safety, entrepreneurial 
skills, employee welfare, employee recognition and entrepreneurial development 
in service sector firms. 
 
Board role performance 
Extant firm governance literature identifies roles which boards of directors may assume 
in decision-making as service, control and strategic roles (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Zahra and 
Pearce, 1989; Maassen, 1999; Daily, et al., 2003; Abor and Biekpe, 2007; Ong and Wan, 2008; 
Peterson and Philpot, 2009). Central to the service role is the co-option of the organisation, 
control of the firm, enhancing reputation of the firm, formulation and implementation of 
decisions if the stewardship theory is applied. We can also apply the agency theory approach to 
examine what is central to the control role as safeguarding interest of shareholders, selecting 
CEO, monitoring CEO/management performance and separation of decision control from 
decision management (Zahra and Pearce, 1989; Maassen, 1999 and Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 
2001). The strategic role can be analysed through resource dependency or stakeholder theory. 
Central to this role is guiding firm mission, developing, implementing and monitoring of the 
firm’s strategy, resource allocation and boundary spanning (Zahra and Pearce, 1989; Maassen, 
1999; Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2001). Board role performance, then, refers to the ability of 
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directors to perform board roles (Ong and Wan, 2008). According to Nicholson and Kiel (2004), 
an effective board is “one that can successfully execute the role set required of it” (p. 453). The 
ability of the board to execute these roles will determine how effectively the board governs the 
company. Ong and Wan (2008) classified board roles into four dimensions: (1) monitoring roles; 
(2) strategic roles; (3) service roles; and (4) resource dependency roles. But resource dependency 
role is itself strategic (see Zahra and Pearce, 1989; Maassen, 1999; Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 
2001). These roles can be theoretically derived and the following table exemplifies: 
 
Table 1: Board roles 
The roles of the board 
Control role Service role Strategic role 
• Маximise owners’ wealth 
• The board monitors managers’ 
activities  to ensure that they are acting 
in the interest of 
owners 
• Selection and election of CEO, 
promotion and dismissal 
• Моnitoring and evaluation of 
company’s performance 
• Ratification of major decisions 
• Reduction of agencies’ Costs 
• Giving advice and 
supporting the 
management 
• Guiding managers 
to accomplish 
company’s 
objectives 
• Participation in 
strategy 
formulation and 
implementation 
• Board is an important 
strategic  mechanism in 
governing the company 
• Strategic decision-
making: the board and 
top management are 
strategic partners in the 
strategic decision-
making process – 
active perspective 
Agency theory Stewardship 
Theory 
Stakeholder Theory 
Source: Developed from literature 
 
Thus central issue of the performance of board roles as indicated in Figure 1 is how to 
ensure accountability of senior managers to their stakeholders while simultaneously providing 
executives with the autonomy and incentives needed for wealth producing strategies (Epps and 
Ismail, 2009). A number of studies on the structural variables of the board have predominated 
literature, but as we show below, the direct relationship with firm performance has been 
inconclusive, perhaps because of their potential to equate performance of the firm with 
performance of the board without any assessment of whether the board is performing its roles for 
which it was hired. Borrowing from the theories identified in this study, we show that attention 
should shift to board role performance from the insistence on structural variables of the board. 
Board structure studies like those of Lipton and Lorsch (1992) and Jensen (1993) observed that 
when firm boards expand beyond seven or eight people, they are less likely to function 
effectively as a curb on management overtime. While the separation of the roles of Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO) from chairperson is a key monitoring mechanism (Abidin et al. 2009), 
Dalton and Dalton (2011) stated that there is no evidence of substantive, systematic relationships 
between corporate financial performance and board leadership structure. As regards the 
composition of the board Bhagat and Black (1999) argue that there is no empirical support for 
proposals that firms should have "supermajority-independent boards" with only one or two inside 
directors. This means, within literature (e.g. Huse 2005; Roberts et al. 2005), individual director 
contribution is basically about creating roles that a board needs to perform (Petrovic, 2008). 
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While the management bears the responsibility for the development of new strategy, the boards’ 
advisory role enables their indirect influence over the strategic decision-making process 
(Nicholson and Newton, 2010). Therefore to concentrate on board role performance as opposed 
to board structures, we will first state the following hypothesis: 
H2:  A relationship exists between board role performance factor structure of observed 
variables and the underlying latent variables of Control, Service, and Strategic 
roles in service sector firms. 
According to Lee, Phan and Yoshikawa (2009), an individual who possesses more human capital 
has more relevant knowledge and experiences necessary to be productive. Performing the role of 
a board member often involves performing non-repetitive tasks that are inherently ambiguous 
and complex. Thus the board may rarely have all the required expertise necessary for the 
undertakings but might be dependent upon the collective expertise of others. These others might 
have to be managers and key employees in an organisation. This is why probably Townsend 
(2007) recommends that management must candidly brief the board on organization and 
leadership capabilities required to implement strategies. In the context of this study, these 
organisation and leadership capabilities are the human capital. These capabilities must be 
supportive of the board, otherwise the board will not be able to have its strategies implemented 
thereby underperforming their role of service provision and others. In a study by Demirbas and 
Yukhanaev (2011), respondents were in favour of employee representatives on the board of 
directors and such a participation of stakeholders in the governance of a company was focused 
on consultation. The authors argued that such participation might not only improve employees’ 
rights in Russia, but also bring a powerful means of monitoring to Russian corporate governance 
system. According to Wilson (1988), employee representation on the board might bring valuable 
first-hand operational knowledge to corporate board decision-making; provide a powerful means 
of monitoring; and thus reduce agency costs within the firm. These findings might also imply 
that the board needs a valuable human capital in organisations from whom to draw resources 
necessary for the performance of its tasks and also provide support for its role-performance. 
Indeed, for instance, the existence of internal audit (a management function) and its importance 
for the effective functioning of the companies (Demirbas and Yukhanaev, 2011), cannot be 
underestimated. The independence of the board and board role performance depend on the 
success of internal audit and so without a well-functioning internal audit it might be perfunctory 
that the audit committee of the board functions improperly. Moreover, the board might want 
entrepreneurial employees in organizations. Entrepreneurship in this case is the practice of 
developing a new venture within an existing organisation, to exploit a new opportunity and 
create economic value (Pinchot 1985). There is evidence that entrepreneurship helps managers to 
renew and revitalize their businesses, to innovate, and to enhance their overall business 
performance (Kuratko et. al. 1990; Antoncic and Hisrich 1990) and so the performance of the 
board by ensuring that a better return to shareholders is realized. And this is likely to be the case 
for developing countries whose company owners are not highly dispersed as those in developed 
nations (Abeysekera, 2007). 
Consequently, relationships between employees and the firm in developing economies 
are far more important than in developed countries (Abeysekera, 2007). Abeysekera’s (2007) 
study of the Sri Lankan case contributes to an understanding of the “entity” view of the firm, 
which argues that the relationships between employees and the firm are the most important factor 
in retaining employees. When applied to CSR under a resource-based view, Abeysekera’s (2007) 
study illustrates the potential of the RBV framework as an analytical tool for studying how CSR 
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and corporate performance are interrelated through their mutual connection to human capital 
resources consistent with the observation of Russo and Fouts (1997).We therefore apply this 
view together with, the “agency” view of the firm, which is an organisational theory that 
assumes that there exists a certain, narrowly defined kind of relationship between investors and 
managers. This understanding is based on the implicit assumption that the firm is a bundle of 
assets delegated by owners to managers who are charged with the task of managing these assets 
(Blair, 1999). Within this framework, the term “agency” according to Abeysekera, (2007) refers 
to the delegation of decision-making rights, which are normally associated with the investors of 
the firm, to managers. These delegated rights include the right to control labour as a means of 
economising the overall running of the firm (Armstrong, 1991). The entity view points out that 
modern management is increasingly interested in addressing the complex role of human input 
into the life of the firm, and is increasingly cognizant of the fact that human capital cannot be 
treated as something separate from corporate governance (Blair, 1999). Our understanding of this 
is that human capital cannot be overlooked when it comes to board role performance. 
 Thus consistent with the above discourse the importance of human capital residing in 
organizations and board role performance can be explained by stakeholder theory, agency theory, 
upper echelons theory and resource based view. The importance of human capital to board role 
performance for instance, can be discerned from a CSR model that advises companies to seek the 
maximum profits while obeying a moral minimum. Indeed Berle and Means’s (1932, p. xii) 
original preface lamented: 
 “Accepting the institution of the large corporation (as we must), and studying it as a human 
 institution, we have to consider the effect on property, the effect on workers, and  the effect upon 
 individuals who consume or use the goods or services which the corporation produces or renders”. 
This concept of the corporation is viewed to have ‘‘placed the community in a position to 
demand that the modern corporation serve not alone the owners or the control but all society’’ 
(Berle and Means, 1932, p. 312). Therefore, the decisions made by the board of directors must be 
made partly in consideration of their effect on workers (human capital). This idea is effectively 
today’s stakeholder theory and thus in responding to stakeholder expectations of CSR, (the board 
and) the chief executive sets the tone and priorities for the firm’s actions (Sirsly, 2009) – 
emphasis is ours. Heald (1970) summarized the importance of CSR 43 years ago: There is a 
justifiable corporate reason for its maintaining a lively interest in social welfare because it cannot 
hope to thrive if it is surrounded by degeneracy and squalor; its corporate existence will avail it 
nothing if its employees should decay. This may imply that investments in CSR may help firms 
develop new competencies, resources, and capabilities, which are partly manifested in a firm’s 
human resources (Barney, 1991; Russo and Fouts, 1997; Wernerfelt, 1984). When CSR is pre-
emptive (Hart, 1995) and a firm’s environment is dynamic or complex, this may help directors 
pursue CSR policies that build managerial competencies because preventive efforts necessitate 
significant employee involvement, organization-wide coordination, and a forward-thinking 
managerial style (Shrivastava, 1995). Thus, CSR can help management develop better scanning 
skills, processes, and information systems, which increase the organization’s preparedness for 
external changes, turbulence, and crises (Russo and Fouts, 1997). These competencies (human 
capital), which are acquired internally through the CSR process, would then lead to more 
efficient utilization of resources (Majumdar and Marcus, 2001). We argue that these are among 
the necessary conditions for the board to perform its roles of control, service and strategic roles 
mentioned earlier.  Given the foregoing discourse, the following main hypothesis will be stated: 
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H3:  There is a positive and significant association between human capital in service 
sector firms and board role performance. 
Figure 1 below shows the tentative conceptual and theoretical model that guided the study. In the 
model we make an assertion that there is a relationship between the factor structure of observed 
variables of employee safety, employee recognition, entrepreneurial skills, employee welfare and 
entrepreneurial development with the latent variable, human capital (H2). Similarly, we make an 
assertion that there is a relationship between the factor structure of observed variables of control 
roles, service roles and strategic roles with the latent variable, board role performance (H1). 
Appropriate human capital is determined by prior CSR investment decisions targeting it and this 
human capital is predicted to influence positive variances in board role performance (H3).  So the 
model advances the argument that board role performance is affected by prior decisions: to 
invest in CSR activities targeting employees that augment firm characteristics such as the 
existence of appropriate human capital for the very performance of its roles. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Human Capital 
Entrepreneurial 
development 
Employee safety 
Service 
roles 
Employee 
recognition 
Entrepreneurial 
skills 
Employee welfare 
Strategic 
roles 
Board role 
performance 
Control 
roles 
CSR Investments inclined to 
human capital by the 
company 
H2 
H1 
H3 + 
Figure 1:Conceptual and theoretical model 
 11 
Methodology 
Sample and characteristics 
The study population consists of 6,534 formal service firms in Kampala region (Uganda 
Bureau of Statistics – Uganda Business Register 2006/07).We generated a sample of 377 service 
firms for this study using Yamane’s (1973) sample selection approach. One hundred twenty eight 
(128) questionnaires were received from respondent firms indicating a response rate of 34%. For 
the unit of analysis, trade and other business services were 64 (or about 50%), hotels and 
restaurants were 17 (or about 13%), transport storage, posts and telecommunications were 21 (or 
about 16%) and financial services were 26 (or about 20%). For the unit of enquiry, the male 
respondents were 97 (about 76%) and the female respondents were 31 (or about 24%).  About 
60% of the respondents had post graduate education; meaning they were able to comprehend the 
questions asked in the questionnaire. It also implies that the managers and directors of service 
sector organizations in Uganda are fairly educated. More than half of the respondents were above 
36 years of age which corroborates the qualification that would normally have been acquired in 
Uganda by such an age bracket. Out of 128 respondents, ninety three (93) were managers (or 
about 73%) and thirty five (35) were directors (or about 27%). This indicates a known difficulty 
in obtaining directors to fill questionnaires. 
 
Measures 
Board (role) performanceWe identify board’s performance of its tasks consistent with the 
works of Heuvel, Gils and Voordeckers (2006); Murphy and Mclntyre, (2007); Petrovic, 2008 
and Huse, (2005) on likert scale of 1-5 designed to measure the opinion or attitude of a 
respondent (Burns & Grove, 2007). As an example Murphy and Mclntyre, (2007) have this say:   
 “Boards can also be judged by their ability to scan the internal and external operating environments for 
opportunities and threats. The ability to act as an external source of knowledge may be bolstered by the 
network of contacts that the board can access. Directors usually have a number of contacts with experience 
and expertise on particular issues that may be relevant to the challenges being faced by the firm. Directors 
may be able to provide more impartial advice on the person-job fit of proposed executives. At the very 
least, BOD may be able to act as a ‘‘sounding board’’ for why a particular individual is being considered 
for an executive position.” (pp. 218-219) 
Similarly, Heuvel, et al. (2006), informs our board role performance measurements because most 
of the service firms in Uganda are small and medium and sometimes family businesses. 
Therefore, in addition to agency, resource dependency, stakeholder and stewardship theories, 
from which we identified roles of boards: the service role, the control role and the strategic role, 
the questions were designed to capture the performance of these roles and were anchored on 5-
point Likert scale ranging from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (5). For the reliability and 
data reduction, see next paragraph. 
Human capital: This study utilised the measurements of human capital (a subset of intellectual 
capital) as developed by Abeysekera (2007). We did this because these measurements are 
consistent with CSR values regarding human capital.  An intellectual capital item is defined as an 
intellectual capital attribute, thus the existence of one or more attributes gives rise to an 
intellectual capital sub-category. The intellectual capital items in the human capital category 
were interpreted and clustered into five sub-categories arising from the principle component 
analysis and confirmatory factor analysis and the reliability statistics for these categories are 
presented in appendix. In the measurement models, certain factors are dropped because of 
measurement variance 
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Statistical Modelling 
To estimate the model, we employed structural equation modelling (SEM). SEM 
addresses the issue of measurement error, and simultaneously estimates a system of structural 
equations. SEM is a comprehensive statistical approach to testing hypotheses about relations 
among observed and latent variables (Hoyle, 1995). According to Rigdon, (1998) it is also a 
methodology for representing, estimating, and testing a theoretical network of (mostly) linear 
relations between variables. MacCallum and Austin (2000) also suggest that SEM tests 
hypothesized patterns of directional and non-directional relationships among a set of observed 
(measured) and unobserved (latent) variables. SEM therefore helps in understanding the patterns 
of correlational/covariance among a set of variables and according to Kline (2011) explains as 
much variance as possible with the model specified. Therefore, in order to account for variation 
and covariation of human capital and board role performance, the present study uses SEM with 
AMOS. We used the estimation procedure in AMOS 18 (Arbucle, 2009) to construct a structural 
equations model. The measurement and structural models are estimated sequentially to reduce 
interpretational confounding and to limit complexity (Anderson and Gerbing, 1988). Missing 
values were not an issue as only complete questionnaires for 128 respondents were used. The 
overall fit of our models were tested using the following criteria of the goodness-of-fit indices: 
The Chi-square test which is an absolute test of model fit requires that the model is rejected if the 
p-value is < .05; Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) should be < .06 and 
Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI) values of .95 or higher (Hu and Bentler, 1999).  Others like Kim 
(2007) and Yang, (2006) recommend Goodness of Fit (GFI) >.90, Adjusted Goodness of Fit 
Index (AGFI) > .85, TLI > .95, CFI > .90, RMSEA < .08 as acceptable goodness-of-fit indices. 
We followed those guidelines in fitting our models. 
We used self-reported data and a questionnaire. Using a post-hoc procedure we attempted 
to detect whether common methods variance was present. The influence of Common Methods 
Variance (CMV) which has been a pervasively cited concern in organizational research 
(Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, and Podsakoff, 2003) affects questionnaire-based studies in social 
sciences (Gorrell. et al., 2011).We performed factor analysis otherwise known as exploratory 
factor analysis or principle component analysis (factors with coefficients below .5 were 
suppressed) to detect whether a single factor would emerge or one ‘general’ factor would 
account for the majority of the covariance in the independent variable and criterion variables 
(Podsakoff and Organ, 1986). This has come to be known as Harman’ one factor test (Sejjaaka, 
2010). Results (not reported) indicated that this study does not materially have the problem of 
CMV. We also tested for discriminant validity which is the degree to which factors that are 
supposed to measure a specific construct do not predict conceptually unrelated criteria (John and 
Benet-Martinez, 2000).To establish discriminant validity of our measures we, first of all, used a 
method proposed by Anderson and Gerbing (1988) who proposed that “discriminant validity can 
be assessed for two estimated constructs by constraining the estimated correlation parameter [...] 
between them to 1.0 and then performing a chi-square difference test(p.416).”Using this 
procedure we, in pairs, compared all constructs, in all of those cases the fit of the models 
(dramatically) worsened. Thus, we concluded that our measures are sufficiently different from 
each other and could be used separately. Secondly, we used Fornell and Larcker’s approach to 
assess discriminant validity (Fornell and Larcker, 1981). In this approach the Average Variance 
Extracted (AVE) for each construct should be higher than the squared correlation between the 
construct and any of the other constructs (Fornell and Larcker,1981).AVE, which measures the 
proportion of variance captured by the construct in relation to measurement error for that 
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construct, should exceed 0.5. According to Chen, et al., (2011), AVE = [sum (λ2)]/[sum (λ2) + 
sum (1-λ2)] where λ is the standardized loadings. Further, convergent validity was performed 
using Bentler-Bonett normed fit index (NFI); a measurement model which shows strong 
convergent validity with a NFI value above .90 (Mark and Sockel, 2001). The results of this and 
other tests are presented in the following section. In all cases, we registered strong convergent 
validity. Moreover to ensure construct validity, a critical review of agency theory, resource-
based view, stewardship theory, stakeholder theory, upper echelons and literature was 
performed. Basing on that review human capital and board role performance concepts, and item 
scales were developed (Saunders, et al. 2006).  
We performed a normality test on our data. As Tabachnick and Fidell, (2007) maintain 
that normality of variables enhances the solution and because the numbers of factors were 
determined using statistical inference, multivariate normality was assumed. We assessed 
normality among single variables by skewness and kurtosis as suggested by Tabachnick and 
Fidell, (2007) because lack of symmetry and kurtosis are the two main ways a distribution 
deviates from normal (Norusis, 1994; Field, 2009). According to Field, (2009), the values of 
kurtosis and skewness should be zero in a normal distribution.  Following this guideline some 
values in the predictor variable indicated significant kurtosis and skewness (after conversion to 
z-scores) at p < .001. More so as almost all scores indicated a negative skew, we used reverse 
score transformations to reverse the scores by subtracting each score from the highest score + 1 
for all the variables and thereafter log transformation  (log(Xi)) was used to approximate to 
normality as recommended by Field  (2009). A reassessment of normality after the 
transformation shown in table II indicates an acceptable normality. 
Table II: Assessment of normality 
Variable min max skew c.r. kurtosis c.r. 
Entrepreneurial Development .000 1.442 -.047 -.216 -.110 -.253 
Employee Relations .000 1.535 .281 1.299 .184 .425 
Employee Welfare .000 1.609 -.261 -1.207 -.071 -.164 
Entrepreneurial Skills .000 1.431 -.391 -1.807 .346 .799 
Employee Safety .000 1.609 .027 .123 -.300 -.692 
Strategic roles .000 1.546 .063 .291 .359 .828 
Service roles .000 1.546 -.202 -.934 .398 .919 
Control roles .000 1.609 .168 .775 .082 .189 
Multivariate      11.456 5.123 
 
Results and discussion 
(H1).The results of our analysis testing the H1 which states that: a relationship exists 
between board role performance factor structure of observed variables and the underlying latent 
variables of control, service, and strategic roles in service sector firms can be discerned from 
figure 2. The board role performance model suggested in this study showed an NFI of 1.000, 
which indicates strong convergent validity and Figure 2 indicates the model in which we 
obtained 6 distinct sample moments, 5 distinct parameters estimated and 1 degree of freedom (6-
5). The chi-square value of .032is non-significant at the .05 level: its p-value is .858 suggesting 
that the model fits the data acceptably in our population. More evidence is provided by the 
RMSEA = .000 which is further supported by the TLI result of 1.028. Additionally, GFI = 1.000 
and AGFI = .999 are larger than .9 which reflects a good fit. Accordingly board role performance 
 14 
structure is confirmed for the case of service firms.  The Hoelter (1983) index indicates that 
26,243 is the largest sample size for which one could accept at the .01 level the hypothesis that 
the default model is correct. And so if our sample size were any bigger than 26,243we would 
reject our model at the .01 level. 
The unstandardized loadings in table III appear along with a critical ratio, and p-values. 
The critical ratio and p-values were used to ascertain statistical significance. A critical ratio - the 
parameter estimate divided by an estimate of its standard error - greater than 1.96 or a p-value 
smaller than .05 signifies significance. Three asterisks (***) indicate that the p-value is smaller 
than .001. In this case all of the unconstrained estimates are significant.  The unstandardized 
weights are highly sensitive to model constraints, whereas the standardized regression weights 
provide more intuitive information about the strength of loadings. All the other indicators have 
strong standardized loadings. The squared multiple correlations provide information about how 
much variance the factors account for in the observed variables. The R2 statistics range from 
moderate to strong regressions. The convergent validity which refers to agreement among the 
multiple items attempting to measure the same construct (Kim, 2009; Koufteros, 1999) can be 
assessed by examining factor loadings. The observed factor loadings compared with their 
standard errors reveal evidence of an association between board role performance and its 
respective constructs of control roles, services roles and strategic roles. As shown in table III, the 
observed factor loadings of all the items are statistically significant at the .01 alpha levels. As for 
item reliability, the multiple regression which is the same as R2, can be used (Koufteros, 1999). 
The squared multiple correlations of the items are listed in table III. In general, an R2 value 
above 0.5 is considered an acceptable reliability for each item (Bollen, 1989). Except for control, 
the other items turned out to be well over the criterion of .05 and thus each item was reliable as a 
measurement item. In addition, estimates of construct reliability were calculated using SPSS. 
Construct reliability refers to the degree to which the measurement of the set of latent items of a 
construct is consistent (Lu et al., 2007). For the measurement model, the proposed cut-off value 
of construct reliability should be 0.7 or higher to indicate adequate construct reliability (Kim, 
2007). The reliability of board role performance was .818, .885 and .898 for control, service and 
strategic respectively. These results confirm construct reliability for the criterion variable in this 
study. Thus all the three items significantly explained board role performance, verifying the 
posited relationships for board role performance factor structure of observed variables and the 
underlying latent variables of control, service, and strategic roles. Based on this information H1 
is substantiated. Our results provide further support for Ong and Wan (2008), Nicholson and Kiel 
(2004). According to these authors, board role performance is the ability of the board to perform 
board roles. For instance for control purposes, the board of directors should ensure that no 
employee of group of employees should be in a position both to perpetrate and to conceal errors 
or fraud in the normal course of their duties. This can ably be handled by the audit committee of 
the board with the help of a well-functioning internal audit (Demirbas and Yukhanaev, 2011) 
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Figure 2: The relationship between board role performance and its latent variables 
 
Note: BRP = board role performance 
 
Table III: Path coefficients for board role performance 
Path 
Unstandar
dised Path 
coeff. 
C.R. Standar
dised 
Path 
coeff. 
R2 AVE p 
Control <--- BRP 1.000  .749 .485 .55 *** 
Service <--- BRP 1.000  .773 .598  *** 
Strategic <--- BRP .884 7.365 .696 .561  *** 
 
(H2). The results of our analysis testing the H2 which states that: a relationship exists 
between human capital factor structure of observed variables and the underlying latent variables 
of employee safety, entrepreneurial skills, employee welfare, employee recognition and 
entrepreneurial development in service sector firms; can be discerned from figure 3. The human 
capital model suggested in this study showed an NFI of .957, again indicating strong convergent 
validity and Figure 3indicates the model in which we obtained 15 distinct sample moments, 10 
distinct parameters estimated and 5 degrees of freedom (15-10). The chi-square value of 8.284 is 
non-significant at the .05 level: its p-value is .141 suggesting that the model fits the data 
acceptably in our population. More evidence is provided by the RMSEA = .072 which is further 
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supported by the TLI result of .964. Additionally, GFI = .973 and AGFI = .920 are larger than .9 
which reflects a good fit. Accordingly human capital structure is confirmed for the case of 
service firms.  The Hoelter (1983) index indicates that 382 is the largest sample size for which 
one could accept at the .01 level the hypothesis that the default model is correct. In other words, 
if our sample size were any bigger than 382 we would reject our model at the .01 level. 
The unstandardized loadings in table IV appear along with a critical ratio, and p-values. 
All the critical ratios are greater than 1.96 and all p-values are smaller than .05 signifying 
significance. Table IV indicates that all of the unconstrained estimates are significant and all the 
indicators have higher standardized loadings. As for convergent validity, the observed factor 
loadings of all the items are statistically significant at the .01 alpha levels, corroborating the NFI. 
We again use R2 to gauge reliability. The squared multiple correlations of the items are listed in 
table 4. Except for entrepreneurial and skills and also for development, the other items turned out 
to be below the criterion of .05 although not very far from the mark. Thus each item was 
conservatively considered reliable as a measurement item for human capital. In addition, 
estimates of construct reliability were calculated using SPSS. The construct reliability of human 
capital was .907, .826, .847, .819 and .795 for employee safety, employee recognition, 
entrepreaneurial skills, employee welfare and entrepreneurial development respectively. These 
results confirm construct reliability for the predictor variable in this study.  Thus all the five 
items significantly explained human capital, verifying the posited relationships for human capital 
factor structure of observed variables and the underlying latent variables of employee safety, 
employee recognition, entrepreneurial skills, employee welfare and entrepreneurial development. 
Based on this information H2 is accepted. The results of this study do not differ materially from 
Abeysekera’s (2007) identification of the constituents of human capital. Thus we confirm that 
the appropriate human capital in organizations is addressing issues of welfare, entrepreneurship, 
employee safety and recognition. The results are also not at variance with Blaug’s (1976) 
understanding of human capital of welfare and skills' acquisition and this confirms that human 
capital theory is indeed rooted in the concept that individuals possess knowledge, skills, or 
experiences (Becker, 1964).This together with the employers’ need to improve work conditions 
(employee safety) or work environment (Werhane, 2008) appears to suggest that indeed CSR 
correlates with organizational competences, learning and efficiency (Nkundabanyanga and 
Okwee, 2011) and provides further evidence for the beliefs of Barney (1991) and Wernerfelt 
(1984) that CSR may help firms to develop new competences, resources and capability. In light 
of this, this study underlies the importance of investments in employee entrepreneurial skills that 
should unlock their potentialities. 
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Figure 3: The relationship between human capital and its latent variables. 
 
Notes:Saf = Employee Safety; Skill = Entrapreneurial Skills; Welf = Employee Welfare; 
Rel = Employee Recognition; Dev = Entrapreneurial Development 
 
Table IV: Path coefficients for human capital 
Path 
Unstandar
dised Path 
coeff. 
C.R. Standar
dised 
Path 
coeff. 
R2 p 
 
Employee Safety <--- Capital 1.000  .709 .445 *** 
Entrepreneurial Skills <--- Capital .773 6.400 .660 .602 *** 
Employee Welfare <--- Capital .803 5.507 .558 .312 *** 
Employee Relations <--- Capital .912 7.202 .776 .436 *** 
Entrepreneurial Development <--- Capital .796 6.457 .667 .503 *** 
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(H3). The results of our analysis testing the H3 which states that: There is a positive and 
significant association between human capital in service sector firms and board role 
performance; can be discerned from Figure 4. The model suggested in this study showed an NFI 
of .971 which also reveals strong convergent validity and Figure 3 indicates the model in which 
we obtained 36 distinct sample moments, 19 distinct parameters estimated and 17 degrees of 
freedom (36-17). The chi-square value of 11.108 is non-significant at the .05 level: its p-value is 
.851 suggesting that the model fits the data acceptably in our population. More evidence is 
provided by the RMSEA = .000 which is further supported by the TLI result of 1.027. 
Additionally, GFI = .980 and AGFI = .958 are larger than .9 which reflects a good fit. As 
expected, the effect of human capital on board role performance (β = .860, p < .001) is 
significant. In other words, the total (direct and indirect) effect of human capital on board role 
performance is .860. That is, due to both direct (unmediated) and indirect (mediated) effects of 
human capital on board role performance, when human capital goes up by 1, board role 
performance goes up by 0.86. Similarly, when human capital goes up by 1 standard deviation, 
board role performance goes up by 0.831 standard deviations. The model in Figure 4 which is 
corroborated by table V indicates that human capital is a significant predictor of board role 
performance and explains 69.1 percent of its variance. In other words, the error variance of board 
role performance is approximately 30.9 percent of the variance of board role performance itself. 
The findings are consistent with the notion that improvement in a service firm’s human 
capital will improve board’s performance of its roles. However based on regression coefficients, 
employee recognition appeared to be critical in the human capital equation followed by 
employee safety. This is followed by entrepreneurial development and entrepreneurial skills 
which fair almost equally. The welfare of employees appears to perform satisfactorily in the 
model. This suggests, for board role performance to be evidenced in service organizations in 
Uganda, all the five hypothesized measures of human capital must be appropriate. The results 
which are consistent with the CSR ideals assure service firms’ owners and other stakeholders 
that a well leveraged human capital in terms of the constructs hypothesized in this study should 
lead to better board role performance.   
Drawing on upper echelons research, we have argued that effectiveness of board of 
directors reflect the values and cognitive bases of powerful actors like employees and managers 
in whom human capital resides. The link between human capital and board role performance has 
been detected in this study. Essentially, an improvement in the quality of human capital explains 
positive variances in board role performance. While agency theory focuses on separation of 
decision control from decision management, this study implies that decision management is an 
important indicator of board role performance usually mirrored in achievement of objectives 
(firm performance). Similarly, while the strategic role of the board is to guide firm mission, 
develop, implement and monitor firm strategy, and resource allocation, execution of such a role 
depends on an appropriate base of human capital residing in managers and other key employees 
in an organisation. This study therefore partly accounts for endogeneity in the study of boards, a 
methodological concern previously cited in literature (see, Bascle, 2008; Hamilton & Nickerson, 
2003). Empirical associations between board role performance and organisational performance 
would not be useful unless we are able to grasp the causal mechanisms the lie behind empirical 
associations (Hambrick, 2007). The results of this study reveal that board role performance is 
affected by prior decisions, for example to invest in CSR activities targeting employees that 
augment firm characteristics such as the existence of appropriate human capital. Our results are 
consistent with some of the prior studies. For example, Adams, Hermalin and Weisbach (2010) 
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found that the issue in board research is that board composition is not exogenously determined 
but rather is affected by prior decisions and firm characteristics that in turn affect board 
decisions. Similarly, Kor and Misangyi (2008) find that entrepreneurial firms going public in 
technology-intensive industries seek out directors with industry-specific experience when current 
executives lack such experience and An and Jin (2004) and Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2007) 
note that boards try to appoint directors with complementary or necessary skills as need arises. 
So, board role performance is indeed complimented by skills already available in the firm. 
The results in the present study have implications for developing human capital in 
organisations and methodological implications. Most companies in developing nations have 
relied on normative guidelines in prescribing what boards need to enhance performance, 
probably explaining why some boards have not been successful in their role performance. Thus 
this study may serve as an exemplar in further developing specific empirical measures that 
reflect developing country contexts or environments. In evaluation studies, measurement 
development can be part of fundamental research that provides a foundation from which to 
facilitate evaluation practices (Joo and Lee, 2011). In the context of this study, we applied and 
modified authoritative models such as those of Heuvel, et al. (2006), Abeysekera, (2007), 
Murphy and Mclntyre, (2007) together with the application of informing theories of agency 
(Berleamd Means, 1932), resource dependency (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), resource-based 
(Wernerfelt, 1984), stakeholder (Freeman, 1984), upper echelons and Stewardship (Davis et al., 
1997),  in order to build the basis of measurement instruments. To validate the instrument, we 
followed the instrument development methodology from psychometrics, which emphasises the 
examination of an instrument’s reliability and validity constructs. In psychometrics, a series of 
statistical analyses, particularly SEM, are imperative in the determination of whether the 
identified instrument is properly designed to measure what it intends to measure and hence 
produce reliable results. So, based on psychometric studies, this study examined not only 
construct validity, but also internal reliability, item reliability and construct validity. 
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Figure 4: The relationship between human capital and board role performance 
 
 
Table V: Regression weights and squared multiple correlations 
Un standardized Regression Weights  
Standardized 
Regression 
Weights 
Squared Multiple 
Correlations 
   Estimate S.E. C.R. P Label 
Estimate  Estim
ate 
BRP <--- Hum_Cap .860 .182 4.735 *** par_9 .831 BRP .691 
Saf <--- Hum_Cap 1.434 .232 6.191 *** par_1 .723 Dev .376 
Skill <--- Hum_Cap 1.000     .607 Rel .642 
Welf <--- Hum_Cap 1.150 .221 5.210 *** par_2 .568 Strategic .798 
Control <--- BRP 1.000     .596 Service .350 
Service <--- BRP .954 .143 6.680 *** par_3 .591 Control .355 
Strategic <--- BRP 1.420 .231 6.153 *** par_4 .893 Welf .323 
Rel <--- Hum_Cap 1.325 .202 6.562 *** par_5 .801 Skill .369 
Dev <--- Hum_Cap 1.030 .158 6.526 *** par_6 .613 Saf .523 
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Conclusions and implications 
Based on the review of the literature and related theories pertaining to human capital and 
board role performance, it was identified that there was gap in the literature as most studies on 
factors influencing board role performance largely fail to consider the role that the human capital 
residing in people in the service firms plays in board’s performance of its tasks. Moreover some 
studies are focused on the human capital of the board without particular regard to the human 
capital in the organisation other than that of the board and these have typically employed the 
resource dependency perspective as opposed to RBV, stakeholder and upper echelons theories. 
So, the objective of this study was to establish the extent to which human capital affect board 
role performance in service sector firms drawing on a multi-theoretic approach. We find that 
human capital is an important predictor of board role performance. The results of this study also 
reveal that board role performance is affected by prior decisions, for example to invest in CSR 
activities targeting employees that augment firm characteristics like existence of appropriate 
human capital. Our results are important because they provide evidence for the first time, as far 
as we are aware, of the relationship between human capital developed through CSR ideals and 
board role performance. This is the first time that such a relationship has been tested using 
responses from company directors as well as managers. 
This study has resulted in important academic and managerial contributions. This study 
contributes to academic research by producing empirical evidence to support theories relevant to 
human capital and board role performance. This research confirms that appropriate human 
capital, which can be leveraged through CSR ideals of employee safety, recognition, welfare, 
training in entrepreneurship; consistent with the stakeholder theory, can facilitate the board in the 
performance of its roles. In the developing-country context, organizations’ boards could use 
these findings as a guideline, that is, what to focus on in the context of human capital 
development in organisations, because doing so improves their own role-performance. Indeed 
the findings of this research have important policy implications for board committees such as 
welfare and audit. The current study presents boards of directors with the ability to classify 
strategies, evaluation guidelines and measures requirements aimed at improving human capital 
for the benefit of the board. This research can be useful to developing nations and service firms 
with similar cultural, economic and political environments to that of Uganda. 
There are number of limitations with our paper. Although we self-administered the 
questionnaire, we did not undertake follow-up interviews which would have informed us of the 
reasons why the respondents held certain views. The study was also limited to service firms in 
Uganda and it is possible that our results are only applicable to Ugandan service sector firms. 
Finally, our study was carried out in one particular year rather than a number of years. It is 
possible that the views held by respondents may change over the years. Despite these limitations, 
we believe that our study makes important contributions in informing board decisions regarding 
their roles and how to bolster the validity of human capital to board role performance. Future 
research may wish to extend the research by examining the possibility of board role performance 
mediating the relationship between human capital and organisational performance. It might also 
be important for future studies to carry out such studies over a number of years too and our study 
carries with it replicative capability. We are also aware that cross-sectional data do not allow for 
testing of the process aspect of the models. However, they provide evidence that the models can 
stand empirical tests. Additional research should examine the process aspects of human capital 
and board role performance. 
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Appendix 
Reliability for board role performance 
Cronbach's Alpha N N of Items 
.818 128 5 
Reliability Statistics for control 
Scale 
Mean if 
Item 
Deleted 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item 
Deleted 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if 
Item 
Deleted 
Our board of directors encourages the idea that no employee or group 
of employees should be in a position both to perpetrate and to conceal 
errors or fraud in the normal course of their duties. 
2.7191 1.684 .584 .792 
Our board of directors adapts performance measures to monitor the 
implementation of strategy, policies and plans, and the legal/fiduciary 
obligations affecting business and the board 
2.6406 1.800 .642 .773 
Our board of Directors monitor the CEO 2.7143 1.712 .601 .785 
Our board of directors establishes mutually agreed management 
performance criteria and business plans 
2.6978 1.816 .625 .778 
Our board of directors uses mutually agreed management performance 
criteria and business plans as the basis for monitoring and evaluating 
management's performance 
2.6874 1.805 .608 .782 
Cronbach's Alpha N No.  of Items 
.885 128 10 
Reliability Statistics for Service 
Scale Mean 
if Item 
Deleted 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item Deleted 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
Our board of directors acts as a source of knowledge bolstered 
by the number of contacts this board accesses 
6.3581 6.900 .676 .870 
Our board of directors provide advice on new ways of 
identifying and developing talent in this organization 
6.3660 7.036 .612 .875 
The contacts of our board of directors always have the requisite 
experience and expertise on particular issues relevant to the 
challenges our organization faces 
6.3629 7.047 .706 .869 
Our organization is reputed because of our board of directors 6.2847 6.726 .671 .870 
Our board of directors act as a ‘’sounding board” for why a 
particular individual is being considered for an executive 
position 
6.2828 7.048 .600 .875 
Our board of directors extend the organizations network contacts 6.4943 7.068 .628 .874 
Our board of directors acts as a source of knowledge 6.4511 6.897 .596 .876 
Our board of directors bring to this organization beneficial ideas 
obtained elsewhere 
6.5534 7.043 .627 .874 
Our board of directors help our organization acquire scarce 
resources like finances 
6.4561 7.176 .493 .884 
Our board of directors engage in activities that link our 
organization to others 
6.5133 7.036 .598 .876 
Cronbach's Alpha N N of Items 
.898 128 12 
Reliability Statistics for Strategic 
Scale 
Mean if 
Item 
Deleted 
Scale 
Variance 
if Item 
Deleted 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if 
Item 
Deleted 
Our Board of directors harness cross-sector partnerships 7.6551 9.625 .637 .889 
Our directors leverage cross-cultural perspectives 7.6015 9.832 .592 .891 
Our directors facilitate cross generational collaboration 7.6009 9.656 .653 .888 
Our Directors encourage development of everyone in this organization to 
think globally 
7.6399 9.623 .584 .892 
Our directors break down glass ceilings (e.g., encourage and promote 
women into senior management positions) 
7.5716 9.635 .560 .893 
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Our board of directors evaluates present and future opportunities, threats 
and risks in the external environment, and current and future strengths, 
weaknesses and risks of the company 
7.6747 9.436 .726 .885 
Our board of directors determines business unit strategies and plans 
designed to implement the corporate strategy 
7.6334 9.674 .558 .893 
Our board of directors ensures that the company's organization structure 
and capability are appropriate for implementing its chosen strategies 
7.7174 9.456 .666 .888 
Our board of directors reviews present and future opportunities, threats 
and risks in the external environment, and current and future strengths, 
weaknesses and risks of the company 
7.7183 9.191 .772 .882 
Our board of directors determines, supports, and enforces company 
policies 
7.7044 9.656 .625 .890 
Our board of directors determines financial and other strategic options 7.7435 9.881 .506 .896 
Our board of directors reviews financial and other strategic options and 
selects those to be pursued, and decides the resources, contingency plans 
and means to support them 
7.7196 9.923 .518 .895 
 
Reliability for Human Capital 
Cronbach's Alpha N N of Items 
.907 128 9 
Employee Safety 
 
Scale 
Mean if 
Item 
Deleted 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item 
Deleted 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Cronbach'
s Alpha if 
Item 
Deleted 
Responsibility for safety and health follows the normal line of 
supervision through all levels in this organization. 
5.8727 6.812 .740 .893 
Managers in this organization ensure compliance using employee safety 
Plans 
5.8898 6.590 .800 .888 
In this organization, there is a detailed list of methods of procedures that 
are applied to Employee Safety Plans, encompassing things like personal 
protective equipment, manual handling, and other, more basic safety 
elements. 
5.8476 6.865 .690 .896 
All supervisors in this company are responsible for protecting their 
employees from occupational hazards 
5.8988 7.038 .616 .901 
Managers in this organization ensure correct health and safety plan 
implementation  
5.9124 6.784 .651 .899 
Potential risks to employees are identified and dealt with during the 
employee safety plans.  
5.8983 6.690 .755 .891 
This organization instigates comprehensive employee safety 5.8298 6.884 .653 .899 
Every individual in this organization has a responsibility to accomplish 
her part of the safety program. 
5.8723 7.086 .605 .902 
Our firm invests in work health programs 5.7470 6.798 .647 .899 
Cronbach's Alpha N N of Items 
.826 128 6 
Employee recognition 
 
Scale 
Mean if 
Item 
Deleted 
Scale 
Variance 
if Item 
Deleted 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if 
Item 
Deleted 
In this organization, employees get thanked for better performance 3.0946 2.388 .687 .779 
Staff of this company interacts freely with anybody in the organization 
regardless of race 
3.2674 2.583 .498 .818 
In this organization employees are encouraged to succeed in life 3.1485 2.364 .695 .777 
Human resources is our major corporate strategic asset 3.0099 2.605 .511 .815 
In this organization employees are featured when they make spectacular 
contributions to the organization 
3.0517 2.372 .645 .787 
My organization attaches great importance to the stability of employees 
(duration level of employees and their overall satisfaction) 
3.0368 2.522 .537 .810 
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Cronbach's Alpha N N of Items 
.847 128 6 
Entrapreneurial Skills 
 
Scale 
Mean if 
Item 
Deleted 
Scale 
Variance 
if Item 
Deleted 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if 
Item 
Deleted 
People in this organization communicate across technical boundaries as 
innovations often start at borders rather than within a set area of expertise 
3.7698 2.164 .699 .807 
People in this organization co-operate with other experts such as 
marketing, R&D, external suppliers, service providers, customers 
3.8424 2.268 .688 .809 
People in this organization have personal initiative 3.8063 2.598 .545 .837 
People in this organization see opportunities that others have not seen 3.7116 2.340 .649 .817 
People in this organization have high need for achievement 3.8610 2.337 .625 .822 
People in this organization have a clear understanding of corporate 
politics and culture 
3.7165 2.369 .570 .833 
Cronbach's Alpha N N of Items 
.819 128 4 
Employee welfare 
 
Scale 
Mean if 
Item 
Deleted 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item 
Deleted 
Corrected 
Item-
Total 
Correlatio
n 
Cronba
ch's 
Alpha 
if Item 
Deleted 
In this organization, there is always an upward review of salaries and welfare 
packages at intervals 
2.5830 1.390 .662 .764 
This organization has staff canteens or lunch subsidy; staff buses; children 
scholarships; car loans, housing allowances and wardrobe allowances 
2.4092 1.374 .601 .792 
This organization instigates comprehensive employee welfare 2.5575 1.319 .734 .730 
This organization encourages socialization events, ceremonies, and corporate 
events such as the family day and foundation day 
2.5605 1.373 .579 .803 
   
Cronbach's Alpha N N of Items 
.795 128 4 
Entrapreneurial development 
 
Scale 
Mean if 
Item 
Deleted 
Scale 
Variance 
if Item 
Deleted 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Cronbach'
s Alpha if 
Item 
Deleted 
This organisation enables the skills development of intrapreneurs 2.5332 .883 .741 .676 
This organization establishes frameworks to encourage intrapreneurial 
processes 
2.5137 .955 .588 .752 
The staff in company persist in new ideas and creative thought  2.5091 .913 .689 .702 
We have employees currently employed to always come up with new 
innovations 
2.5332 1.037 .430 .831 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
